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I. INTRODUCTION

Traditionally, corporations have been linked primarily to their respective
home countries.1 Firms have operated abroad as long as transportation has
permitted relatively easy travel across national boundaries,2 but the fixed
location of tangible property tended to restrict corporate wealth and identity
to fairly defined boundaries.3 In the early days of the U.S. income tax, when
corporations were only offered a deduction rather than a credit for taxes paid
to foreign governments,4 firms may have been tempted to move at least
some operations overseas to reduce their tax burden amidst the rising rates
of World War I, but this was soon remedied.5 Indeed, the adoption of the
foreign tax credit in 1918 was supported as a means “to prevent revenue loss

*
Vice Dean and Professor, UCLA School of Law. Portions of this essay are derived from
Chapter 7 of Steven A. Bank, Anglo-American Corporate Taxation: Tracing the Common Roots of
Divergent Approaches (Cambridge Univ. Press 2011). Copyright © Steven A. Bank. 2011.
Reprinted with the permission of Cambridge University Press. This article is part of Pepperdine
Law Review’s January 18, 2013 Tax Advice for the Second Obama Administration symposium, cosponsored by Tax Analysts.
1. See STEVEN A. BANK, FROM SWORD TO SHIELD 261 (2010).
2. See generally Ron Harris, Law, Finance, and the First Corporations, in GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVES ON THE RULE OF LAW 145 (James J. Heckman et al. eds., 2009).
3. This was particularly evident in the analogous situation of antebellum state property tax
regimes. See C.K. YEARLEY, THE MONEY MACHINES: THE BREAKDOWN AND REFORM OF
GOVERNMENTAL AND PARTY FINANCE IN THE NORTH, 1860–1920, at 218 (1970).
4. Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. O’Hear, The “Original Intent” of U.S. International
Taxation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1021, 1041 (1997).
5. See id. at 1044–45.
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through incorporation of foreign subsidiaries or expatriation.”6 As the
mobility of capital, labor, and property further increased and political
barriers continued to decline, however, the true multinational corporation
inevitably began to emerge.
This development of the multinational corporation has accelerated in
recent years due in part to an increase in cross-border mergers and
acquisitions. A dramatic rise in cross-border activity accompanied the
success of the U.S. stock market in the 1990s.7 Despite some fluctuation in
the wake of the most recent economic recession, corporate globalization
continues to grow.8 According to the Factset Mergerstat Review, the
number of U.S. firms that acquired foreign entities increased to 1,736 in
2007, as compared to 1,708 in 2006 and 1,107 in 1997.9 Mirroring this
trend, U.S. firms acquired by foreign entities increased from 1,490 in 2005
and a mere 167 in 1992 to 1,526 in 2006. 10
Even where corporations continue to be nominally located in the U.S.,
the major growth in corporate profits, although not necessarily sales, has
occurred outside the U.S.11 From 2006 through 2011, corporate profits grew
by approximately $219 billion, but only $36.6 billion of that was from
domestic activities and the remaining $182 billion of growth occurred in the
rest of the world.12 According to the Congressional Budget Office’s recently
released report, Options for Taxing U.S. Multinational Corporations,
approximately half of all revenues from the corporate income tax came from
multinational corporations with income earned in foreign countries.13
Effectively, firms have found ways to “redomicile themselves” outside of
the formal incorporation mechanism.14
Professor Mihir Desai of Harvard Business School, characterizing this
globalization process as the “decentering” of the modern business

6. Roswell Magill & William C. Schaab, American Taxation of Income Earned Abroad, 13
TAX L. REV. 115, 118 (1958) (citing 56 CONG. REC. 677–78 (1918)).
7. Julian di Giovanni, What Drives Capital Flows? The Case of Cross-Border M&A Activity
and Financial Deepening, 65 J. INT’L ECON. 127, 131 (2005); see BANK, supra note 1, at 262.
8. Di Giovanni, supra note 7, at 128; see BANK, supra note 1, at 262.
9. FACTSET, MERGERSTAT REVIEW 2007, at 50 (2007); see BANK, supra note 1, at 262.
10. FACTSET, supra note 9, at 94; see BANK, supra note 1, at 262.
11. Harry Grubert, Foreign Taxes and the Growing Share of U.S. Multinational Company
Income Abroad: Profits, Not Sales, are Being Globalized, 65 NAT’L TAX J. 247 (2012).
12. National Income and Product Accounts, Table 6.16.D, Corporate Profits by Industry, U.S.
DEP’T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, http://www.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?reqid=
9&step=3&isuri=1&910=X&911=0&903=239&904=2006&905=1000&906=A (last updated Feb.
28, 2013).
13. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, OPTIONS FOR TAXING U.S. MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 1
(Jan. 2013), available at http://www.cbo.gov/publication/43764.
14. Mihir A. Desai, A Better Way to Tax U.S. Businesses, 90 HARV. BUS. REV. 134, 137–38
(2012) [hereinafter Desai, A Better Way to Tax].
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corporation, noted that “[t]he archetypal multinational firm with a particular
national identity and a corporate headquarters fixed in one country is
becoming obsolete as firms continue to maximise the opportunities created
by global markets. National identities can mutate with remarkable ease and
firms are unbundling critical headquarters functions and reallocating them
worldwide.”15 According to Desai, “[t]he defining characteristics of what
made a firm belong to a country—where it was incorporated, where it was
listed, the nationality of its investor base, the location of its headquarters
functions—are no longer unified nor are they bound to one country.” 16
Partially due to this decentering of the firm, U.S. corporate tax revenues
as a percentage of gross domestic product have declined precipitously, both
as compared with the U.S. in the 1970s and as compared with other
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
nations.17 In fact, “[c]orporate tax receipts as a share of profits are at their
lowest level in at least 40 years,” amounting to a mere 12.1% in fiscal year
2011, as compared with 25.6% on average between 1987 and 2008.18 As
these rates rise and it becomes increasingly difficult to pin down a
corporation’s true location, firms will have greater opportunities to reap the
benefits of international differences in the corporate tax system.19
With the breakdown of national affiliation and its effect on corporate tax
revenues, it is not surprising that international tax reform is a major part of
President Obama’s Framework for Business Tax Reform as he begins his
second term.20 Congressional leaders have already started investigating
structural reform and the Congressional Budget Office released a report in
January of 2013 examining legislative options for moving the U.S. scheme
closer to either a purer worldwide system of taxing multinational
corporations than it currently has or instead converting to a territorial
system.21 As Senate Finance Committee Chair Max Baucus remarked in
support of considering structural reforms to the U.S. international tax

15. Mihir A. Desai, The Decentering of the Global Firm, in THE WORLD ECONOMY 1271,
1271–72 (2009).
16. Id. at 1272.
17. Desai, A Better Way to Tax, supra note 14, at 138.
18. Damian Paletta, With Tax Break, Corporate Rate Is Lowest in Decades, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 3,
2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204662204577199492233215330.html.
19. See BANK, supra note 1, at 262.
20. WHITE HOUSE AND DEP’T OF TREASURY, THE PRESIDENT’S FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESS
TAX REFORM 13–15 (Feb. 2012), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/taxpolicy/Documents/The-Presidents-Framework-for-Business-Tax-Reform-02-22-2012.pdf.
21. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 13, at 1.
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scheme, “In the past two decades, the number of U.S.-based companies on
the Fortune Global 500 list has declined by 20 percent. . . . When it comes
to international tax rules, we seem to have the worst of all worlds.”22
Part of the difficulty with legislative measures to address the corporate
tax evasion problem, however, is that U.S. multinational corporations
already easily sidestep them. As Lee Sheppard of Tax Analysts explains:
International corporate income taxation is in crisis. U.S.
multinationals are paying little or no tax to any government,
including the U.S. government. . . .
Yet American tax policymakers are arguing about whether to
convert to a territorial system that stands to make all of the existing
problems worse, ignoring the do-it-yourself territorial system that
U.S. multinationals already enjoy. It would be a terrible cliché to
say that the territorial argument is tantamount to rearranging the
deck chairs while the boat is taking on water, but it is.23
According to economist Kimberly Clausing, multinational corporations
avoid approximately $90 billion a year in taxes as a result of income
shifting.24 Desai concludes that the current system is dysfunctional, noting
that “[t]he complexity of the current system and the proliferation of tax
avoidance techniques have made the corporate tax optional for many global
corporations.”25
The problem is highlighted in the case of global technology companies,
where the primary asset and source of income is intellectual property that
may be easily shifted to tax-friendly locations. Many of these global
technology companies have transferred income-producing assets such as
intellectual property to Ireland, whose low 12.5% corporate income tax rate
allowed it to attract major corporations and become a center of high
technology jobs in Europe.26 At the same time, however, the ability to
manipulate the legal definition of home, especially in light of differing
national standards, plus lax transfer pricing rules, has led to the rise of the
“Double Irish” or “Dutch Sandwich” scheme that helps companies avoid
even Ireland’s low corporate tax rate.27 Reportedly used or contemplated by

22. Diana Fuchtgott-Roth, Corporate Tax Reform Should Come First, 137 TAX NOTES 901, 901
(Nov. 19, 2012) (quoting Senator Max Baucus, Chairman, S. Fin. Comm., Keynote Address at the
Bipartisan Policy Center Special Presentation: The Tax Piece of the Debt Puzzle (June 11, 2012)).
23. Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis: Why Do We Need Treaties?, 137 TAX NOTES 825, 825–26
(2012).
24. Kimberly A. Clausing, A Challenging Time for International Tax Policy, 136 TAX NOTES
281, 281 (2012).
25. Desai, A Better Way to Tax, supra note 14, at 136.
26. Frank Barry, Tax Policy, FDI and the Irish Economic Boom of the 1990s, 33 ECON.
ANALYSIS & POL’Y 221, 222–23 (2003).
27. For a fuller description of the “Double Irish” scheme, see Joseph B. Darby III & Kelsey
Lemaster, Double Irish More Than Doubles the Tax Saving: Hybrid Structure Reduces Irish, U.S.
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a number of American-identified companies such as Apple, Google,
Facebook, and Microsoft, the “Double Irish” involves the creation of two
Irish companies, one of which has its “effective centre of management” in
Bermuda or some other tax haven jurisdiction.28 The Bermuda-based
company pays a relatively low fee for a license to the parent company for
the right to sublicense its intellectual property to the Irish-based subsidiary,
which uses it in the sale of products outside the U.S.29 The Bermuda-based
company is an Irish company for U.S. purposes, which presumably aids in
the approval of the transfer pricing arrangement because of the presence of a
U.S.–Ireland tax treaty, but is a Bermuda company for Irish purposes, which
allows it to avoid Irish taxes.30 This arrangement leaves the American parent
with little income in the U.S. because of the low transfer fee and the Irishbased subsidiary with no net income in Ireland because the royalty payment
cancels out its income.31 To avoid Irish withholding taxes on the payment
from the Irish subsidiary to the Bermuda-based Irish subsidiary, the money
is funneled through a Dutch firm that qualifies for the exemption available to
payments to companies within the European Union.32 The result is that there
is no revenue in Ireland and virtually all of the income is sourced to
The parent company is
Bermuda, which has no corporate tax.33
headquartered in the United States, the work is largely performed in Ireland,

and Worldwide Taxation, PRACTICAL US/INT’L TAX STRATEGIES, May 15, 2007, at 2, 12–14;
Edward D. Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 699, 706–13 (2011); Jesse Drucker,
Google 2.4% Rate Shows How $60 Billion Lost to Tax Loopholes, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 21, 2010),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-21/google-2-4-rate-shows-how-60-billion-u-s-revenuelost-to-tax-loopholes.html [hereinafter Drucker, Google].
28. See Drucker, Google, supra note 27. The recent revelation that Facebook only paid £2.9
million in tax in Ireland on £840 million in total non-U.S. profit, and only £238,000 in tax in the
U.K. on an estimated £175 million in total profits on ads sold in the U.K. has led to calls for
increased enforcement efforts in the U.K. See Rupert Neate, Facebook Paid £2.9m Tax on £840m
Profits Made Outside U.S., Figures Show, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Dec. 23, 2012,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2012/dec/23/facebook-tax-profits-outside-us/print. Similarly,
Australian tax authorities claim that Facebook, Google, Apple, and eBay have collectively avoided
as much as $1 billion in revenues. Phil Jacob, Big Firms Play ‘Double Dutch’ to Skip on Tax,
TELEGRAPH (London), Dec. 27, 2012, http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/news/big-firms-playdouble-dutch-to-skip-on-tax/story-e6freuy9-1226543763777.
29. J. Bryan Lowder, The Double Irish and the Dutch Sandwich: The Explainer’s Field Guide to
Exotic Tax Dodges, SLATE (Apr. 14, 2011), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/
explainer/2011/04/the_double_irish_and_the_dutch_sandwich.html.
30. Id. While the U.S. uses legal incorporation as the standard, Ireland bases tax residency on
where a corporation is managed and controlled. Darby & Lemaster, supra note 27, at 13.
31. See Lowder, supra note 29.
32. See Darby & Lemaster, supra note 27, at 14; Drucker, Google, supra note 27.
33. See Darby & Lemaster, supra note 27, at 14; Drucker, Google, supra note 27

1311

08 BANK SSRN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

5/16/13 9:13 AM

the license is owned in Bermuda by a company incorporated in Ireland, and
the income is taxed nowhere until repatriated to the U.S.34
Although the U.S. is not without tools to try to unilaterally target a
transaction like the “Double Irish” or “Dutch Sandwich,”35 it demonstrates
the multinational nature of the corporate tax evasion problem. The scheme
relies on the U.S.–Ireland tax treaty and the lower corporate tax rate in
Ireland, the distinction between the incorporation-based definition of tax
home in the U.S. and the “managed and controlled” definition in Ireland,36
the presence of an exemption from the Irish withholding tax for royalty
payments to a European Union (EU) member state such as the Netherlands,37
the ability to move money from the Netherlands to Bermuda without a
Dutch withholding tax through the use of Dutch “special financial units,”38
and the absence of a corporate income tax in a jurisdiction like Bermuda.39
Effectively, the ease in moving corporate assets and the malleability in the
definition of legal home, combined with a few tax-friendly jurisdictions,
makes it increasingly difficult for countries to unilaterally maintain the
integrity of their separate corporate tax systems except in the case of purely
domestic corporations.40
Noticeably missing from Obama’s Framework for Business Tax
Reform, from the Congressional Budget Office’s (CBO) report on the
Options for Taxing U.S. Multinational Corporations, and from most
discussion of the major structural reform proposals, is any mention of the
influence and importance of international reform efforts.41 Although the
concern over corporate tax evasion is especially pronounced in the U.S., this
decentering phenomenon and its effect on corporate tax revenues is by no

34. See Darby & Lemaster, supra note 27, at 14; Drucker, Google, supra note 27.
35. For example, the scheme appears to rely on the U.S. having approved the transfer pricing
agreement for the transfer of licensing rights from the U.S. corporation to the Irish holding company
at favorable rates and it relies on the Dutch and second Irish company (which is considered a
Bermuda company for Irish purposes) being classified as disregarded entities under the U.S. checkthe-box regulations. Kleinbard, supra note 27, at 708, 710; see also Stephen C. Loomis, Recent
Development, The Double Irish Sandwich: Reforming Overseas Tax Havens, 43 ST. MARY’S L.J.
825, 845–52 (2012) (discussing possible solutions such as utilizing Section 482 to reallocate income,
promulgating new anti-abuse regulations under the Controlled Foreign Corporation rules, reducing
tax rates to decrease incentives for evasion, or adopting an international minimum tax).
36. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
37. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
38. See Jesse Drucker, Yahoo, Dell Swell Netherlands’ $13 Trillion Tax Haven, BLOOMBERG
(Jan. 22, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-23/yahoo-dell-swell-netherlands-13trillion-tax-haven.html.
39. Drucker, Google, supra note 27 (“The earnings wind up in island havens that levy no
corporate income taxes at all.”).
40. WHITE HOUSE & DEP’T OF TREASURY, supra note 20, at 15.
41. See WHITE HOUSE & DEP’T OF TREASURY, supra note 20, at 13–15; CONG. BUDGET OFFICE,
supra note 13, at 1.
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means an exclusively American problem. As Edward Kleinbard, former
Chief of Staff of Congress’s Joint Committee on Taxation, pointed out in
referring to the “Double Irish” transaction: “This tax avoidance strategy used
by Apple and other multinationals doesn’t just minimize the companies’
U.S. taxes . . . . It’s German tax and French tax and tax in the U.K. and
elsewhere.”42 Consequently, around the world, nations are under direct and
indirect pressure to reform their corporate tax laws.43 Not only will this have
an effect on U.S. tax laws and on the tax burdens of U.S. multinational
corporations regardless of whether the U.S. actually decides to reform its
own laws, it will have an effect on the success of corporate tax reform
initiated in the U.S.44 This essay argues that any attempt to reform corporate
taxation inevitably has to be undertaken as part of, or at least in light of, the
already-existing global effort in this area—rather than operating purely as a
domestic legislative matter.
II. THE GLOBAL CORPORATE TAX REFORM MOVEMENT
Given the multinational nature of the corporate income tax problem, it is
not surprising that the search for a solution has taken place on a
multinational level. In Europe, where the EU has used a variety of
mechanisms at its disposal to force changes in the tax policies of its member
states, this effort has been more top-down than collaborative.45 No treaty
specifically provides the EU the authority to interfere with individual
member states’ domestic corporate tax schemes, but a variety of directives
have been advanced “to minimise corporate tax factors as an obstacle to
doing business in the Single Market.”46 For example, prompted by the
European Community Treaty’s guarantee of “free movement of goods,
persons, services and capital,” and the provision for nondiscrimination based
on nationality,47 the European Court of Justice (ECJ) prohibited providing
domestic individuals and products with more favorable tax treatment than
foreign individuals and taxpayers.48 This same principle was applied in the

42. Charles Duhigg & David Kocieniewski, How Apple Sidesteps Billions in Taxes, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 28, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/29/business/apples-tax-strategy-aims-at-low-taxstates-and-nations.html?pagewanted=all.
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. See ALISTAIR CRAIG, EU LAW AND BRITISH TAX: WHICH COMES FIRST? (2003).
46. CRAIG, supra note 45, at 11.
47. Single European Act, arts. 12–13, Feb. 17, 1986, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1.
48. Michael J. Graetz & Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Income Tax Discrimination and the Political and
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EU’s so-called “Parent/Subsidiary Directive,” which focused on outlawing
the double taxation of dividends paid by a subsidiary of one member state to
its parent company located in another member state.49 Indeed, the ECJ had
“decided more than a hundred cases involving Member States’ income tax
systems” as of 2007.50 As a result, Michael Graetz and Alvin Warren
concluded that “the Court has become deeply enmeshed in fashioning the
Member States’ income tax policies.”51
The power of these multilateral efforts is evident in changes that have
already occurred. In large part, the United Kingdom’s 1997 and 1999
reforms to the shareholder dividend credit under the imputation system were
instigated by the growing influence of the ECJ. The U.K. had systematically
discriminated against foreign individuals through its imputation scheme and
had institutionalized that arrangement as far back as the 1975 United
Kingdom–United States Double Taxation Convention, in which it agreed to
grant the shareholder credit to U.S. investors, less a fifteen percent deduction
of the dividend and tax credit.52 Although no specific ruling addressed the
U.K. system, government officials saw the writing on the wall. Within a few
years, in Verkooijen, the ECJ struck down a Dutch imputation arrangement
similar to the one in place in the U.K.53 As Peter Harris and David Oliver
observed, “it was the nail in the coffin of the standard European imputation
system, which usually provided relief from economic double taxation of
domestic dividends but not foreign dividends.”54
Some have predicted that the ECJ’s formal intervention in member state
corporate tax policies will ultimately lead to the development of a European
corporate income tax. In 2003, The Times reported that “Britain is losing
control of its corporate tax base as tracts of company tax law are overturned
by the European Court of Justice”55 and a study by the Centre for Policy
Studies concluded that “Britain, and the other Member States of the EU,
have lost effective control over how they set their corporation tax laws.”56 In
subsequent years, the ECJ has continued to issue a number of rulings that

Economic Integration of Europe, 115 YALE L.J. 1186, 1198–99 (2006).
49. CRAIG, supra note 45, at 13.
50. Michael J. Graetz & Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Dividend Taxation in Europe: When the ECJ
Makes Tax Policy, 44 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1577, 1577 (2007).
51. Id. at 1578.
52. Malcolm Gammie, UK Imputation, Past, Present and Future, 52 BULL. FOR INT’L FISCAL
DOCUMENTATION 429, 433 (1998).
53. Staatssecretaris van Financiën v. B.G.M. Verkooijen, 2000 E.C.R. I-4071.
54. PETER HARRIS & DAVID OLIVER, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL TAX 294 (2010).
55. Gary Duncan, Chancellor Accused of Losing Control of Corporate Tax to EU, TIMES
(London), Dec. 5, 2003, at 41.
56. CRAIG, supra note 45, at i.
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have resulted in changes or proposals for changes to British corporate tax
policy, with little sign of a slowdown.57
Beyond the ad hoc ECJ intrusions into the corporate tax policy of
individual European nations, there have been a variety of direct efforts to
more formally harmonize European corporate tax systems over the last forty
years.58 Initially, those efforts were focused on rates.59 After a few attempts
to directly legislate corporate tax harmonization, the European Commission
issued a draft directive in 1970 proposing “closer alignment of corporate tax
rates across the then Member States at levels between 45% and 55%.”60 A
similar proposal was made in 1992 when the European Commission’s
Report of the Committee of Independent Experts on Company Taxation
“recommended the harmonisation of corporate tax rates between 30% and
40% across the EU.”61
Although neither effort to harmonize rates was successful,62 the
European Commission has promulgated a number of mechanisms, ostensibly
designed to ensure that individual corporate tax systems do not interfere with
the smooth functioning of the Single Market, but arguably operating to
reduce much of the individual non-rate variation among the member states.63
These included the Parent/Subsidiary Directive described above, the
Mergers Directive,64 which helped facilitate mergers and reorganizations,
and the Arbitration Procedure Convention, in which disputes over the
taxation of profits earned by related companies in different member states
were settled according to EU arbitration procedures.65 These measures are
relatively modest intrusions on national sovereignty that were widely
accepted as helpful to business, but indirectly they help push the member
states closer to a common European corporate tax.
A much more collaborative effort to institute a direct harmonization
mechanism was afoot in the creation of the Code of Conduct on Business

57. See, e.g., Gabriel Rozenberg, Corporate Tax Review Eyes Return of Pounds, TIMES
(London), June 22, 2007, at 62 (describing proposed exemption of groups with foreign operations in
countries with lower corporate tax rates from a separate dividend tax upon repatriation to Britain).
58. Charles E. McLure, Jr., Harmonizing Corporate Income Taxes in the European Community:
Rationale and Implications, 22 TAX POL’Y & ECON. 151, 152 (2008).
59. Id. at 153–54.
60. CRAIG, supra note 45, at 12.
61. Id. at 14.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Council Directive 90/434/EEC, 1990 O.J. (L 225) 1, available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31990L0434:en:HTML.
65. CRAIG, supra note 45, at 12–13.

1315

08 BANK SSRN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

5/16/13 9:13 AM

Taxation in December of 1997.66 Through intensive and prolonged
negotiations, the member states agreed to abolish or limit a number of
harmful tax incentives or benefits offered by individual member states.
Some have called this an example of the “Open Method of Coordination,”
which involves the use of voluntary and non-binding guidelines as “a means
of spreading best practice and achieving convergence towards the EU
goals.”67
Although the Code was a product of a more collaborative effort than
individual ECJ decisions, individual nations still are concerned that it could
expand to cover more controversial domestic tax issues than originally
contemplated.68 A House of Lords Select Committee Report cited just this
risk when it noted:
We remain unclear about the implications for the United
Kingdom of having agreed to this Code, in particular in relation to
national sovereignty and to the principle of unanimity in tax
matters. . . . [T]here remains the risk that the process could lead to
the UK being obliged—in practice if not in law—to adopt tax
measures damaging to the interests of the economy or of citizens.69
One particular concern, expressed by Conservative commentator Alistair
Craig, is that the Code could interfere with a British government interested
in cutting taxes in a way to induce investment, although there is no
precedent for this in other countries.70
The European Commission went one step further than the more
voluntary Code when it proposed to create a “common consolidated
corporate tax base” in Europe.71 The proposal emerged from concerns that
multinational corporations could evade taxes by shifting profits to lower tax
countries and countries are ill-equipped to combat this through transfer
pricing conventions.72 The common consolidated corporate tax base would
use a formulary apportionment system to allocate income from multinational
corporations to member states based on the employees, payroll, sales, and/or
assets in the jurisdiction.73 Such a system is already in place in the U.S. and

66. See Harmful Tax Competition, EUROPEAN COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/
taxation/company_tax/harmful_tax_practices/index_en.htm (last updated Mar. 14, 2013).
67. Claudio M. Radaelli, The Code of Conduct Against Harmful Tax Competition: Open Method
of Coordination in Disguise?, 81 PUB. ADMIN. 513, 513 (2003).
68. CRAIG, supra note 45, at 15–16.
69. SELECT COMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, TAXES IN THE EU: CAN CO-ORDINATION
AND
COMPETITION CO-EXIST?, 1998-99, H.L. 92, ¶ 19 (U.K.), available at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199899/ldselect/ldeucom/92/9203.htm.
70. Id. ¶ 16.
71. Leon Betterndorf et al., Corporate Tax Harmonization in the EU, 25 ECON. POL’Y 539, 540
(2010).
72. Id. at 539.
73. Id.

1316

08 BANK SSRN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

[Vol. 40: 1307, 2013]

5/16/13 9:13 AM

Globalization of Corporate Tax Reform
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

Canada to deal with allocating corporate income among the various states
and provinces, respectively.74 The problem, however, is agreeing upon a
common corporate tax base for such a system, which would mean each
member state would have to relinquish a measure of autonomy over the
creation of its corporate tax provisions. This also requires each member
state to agree to such a base under the unanimity principle, which is difficult
and has delayed the process considerably. One British study warned that
business “would face a higher tax burden, as part of the harmonisation of
corporate business,” costing them as much as £4 billion per year.75 The
Times advised that:
If Britain really wants to resist a common tax policy, it would
need to take an alternative initiative. One might be to encourage
EU tax experts to draw up unofficial model rules that evolve with
time and that member states can use as a default where they have no
different national priority. Otherwise, the Commission’s siege
engines will roll on.76
The European Commission and the EU have used several of these
mechanisms to pressure member states when their corporate tax systems
deviate too substantially from the norm. This is particularly evidenced by
the experience with Ireland. The country has a long experience with
reducing its corporate tax rate in an attempt to attract foreign direct
investment, dating back to the late 1950s.77 At one point, the country
completely exempted from tax income from manufactured exports, but this
was phased out starting in 1978 and ultimately replaced in 1980 with a 10%
rate for the manufacturing industry.78 This special rate was later extended to
cover activities at the International Financial Services Centre in Dublin and
in a tax-free zone surrounding Shannon airport, but the prevailing rate for
companies not covered by any of those exceptions remained at 32%.79
Eventually, this special rate came under scrutiny by the European
Commission, which pressured Ireland to raise it to a rate “much closer to the

74.
75.

Id. at 540.
Elizabeth Judge, Single European Tax Could Cost UK Business £4bn, Academics Warn,
TIMES (London), May 3, 2007, at 55.
76. Graham Searjeant, EU Has Company Tax in Its Sights, TIMES (London), Dec. 16, 2005, at
61.
77. Barry, supra note 26, at 223.
78. Id.
79. Id.; Sheila Killian, Where’s the Harm in Tax Competition? Lessons from US Multinationals
in Ireland, 17 CRITICAL PERSP. ON ACC’T 1067, 1075 (2006).
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EU average.”80 Moreover, the EU alleged that the disparate treatment of
domestic and foreign manufacturers violated the Code of Conduct on
Business Taxation and the OECD’s “Guidelines on Harmful Preferential Tax
Regimes.”81 In response to this EU pressure, both on the level of its rates
and on its non-uniform application, Ireland eventually agreed in 1998 to
raise its manufacturing rate to 12.5% and to extend for all corporations,
effective starting in 2003.82 The 2010 EU bailout of the Irish government
led to renewed calls for an increase in Ireland’s corporate tax rate.83 While
that has not happened, EU rules have thus far stymied efforts by Northern
Ireland to secure the right to reduce its corporate tax rate to 12.5% as well.84
More recently, there has been a push for more cooperative efforts to
address the global problem of corporate tax evasion exemplified in the
“Double Irish” or “Dutch Sandwich” transaction described earlier.85 In
November of 2012, the OECD announced a project to “prevent base erosion
and profit shifting.”86 According to the OECD briefing on this project:
Domestic rules for international taxation and internationally agreed
standards are still grounded in an economic environment
characterised by a lower degree of economic integration across
borders, rather than today’s environment of global taxpayers,
characterised by the increasing importance of intellectual property
as a value-driver and by constant developments of information and
communication technologies. For example, some rules and their
underlying policy were built on the assumption that one country
would forgo taxation because another country would be imposing
tax. In the modern global economy, this assumption is not always
correct, as planning opportunities may result in profits ending up
untaxed anywhere.87

80. Barry, supra note 26, at 223.
81. Killian, supra note 79, at 1075.
82. Barry, supra note 26, at 223.
83. Paul Taylor, Analysis: Ireland’s Corporate Tax in Dispute in EU Rescue, REUTERS (Nov.
19, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6AI3HN20101119.
84. Jamie Smyth, Treasury Resists N Ireland Corporation Tax Cuts Plan, FINANCIAL TIMES
(London),
June
25,
2012,
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/0d5f38d8-bee0-11e1-bebe00144feabdc0.html#axzz2NkpZ9tff (“Under European Union rules any reduction in corporation tax
in Northern Ireland would have to be accompanied by a reduction in the block grant from
Westminster. The Treasury currently predicts the costs of a tax cut to the block grant could reach
£500m.”).
85. See supra notes 27–34 and accompanying text.
86. See Org. for Econ. Coop. and Dev., Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps.htm (last visited Jan. 2, 2013) (quoting G20 Leaders Declaration of
June 19, 2012).
87. OECD, THE OECD WORK ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING 1 (2013), available at
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The OECD identified several “key pressure areas” that created an
environment in which corporate base erosion flourished:
• International mismatches in entity and instrument characterisation
including hybrid mismatch arrangements and arbitrage;
• application of treaty concepts to profits derived from the delivery
of digital goods and services;
• the tax treatment of related party debt-financing, captive insurance
and other inter-group financial transactions;
• transfer pricing, in particular in relation to the shifting of risks and
intangibles, the artificial splitting of ownership of assets between
legal entities within a group, and transactions between such entities
that would rarely take place between independents;
• the effectiveness of anti-avoidance measures, in particular
GAARs, CFC regimes and thin capitalisation rules; and
• the availability of preferential regimes for certain activities.88
The OECD recommended coordinated efforts to alleviate the divergent
domestic rules and regulations that contributed to this base-erosion
environment.89
Motivated by similar concerns, the European Commission introduced a
plan in December of 2012 “to strengthen the fight against tax fraud and tax
evasion.”90 A Communication from the European Commission to the
European Parliament and Council proposed a variety of specific measures,
including recommendations that member states adopt minimum standards
for good governance in tax matters that they could directly and indirectly
pressure third-party nations to adopt.91 It also proposed adopting a “common

http://www.oecd.org/ctp/TheOECDworkonBEPS.pdf.
88. Id. at 2.
89. Id. at 2–3.
90. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, at 1,
COM (2012) 722 final (Dec. 6, 2012), available at http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/
resources/documents/taxation/tax_fraud_evasion/com_2012_722_en.pdf.
91. Id. at 6.
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general anti-abuse rule” that it could encourage or require member states to
include in all bilateral treaties.92
III. THE INFLUENCE OF GLOBAL CORPORATE TAX REFORM
Although the U.S. is not subject to the jurisdiction of many of these
international or regional groups, the European Commission’s abovedescribed proposals to push for the adoption of its standards by third parties
reveals one mechanism by which the U.S. and other non-member states
could be influenced directly by global corporate tax reform. It would not be
unprecedented for the U.S. system of business taxation to arouse the scrutiny
and displeasure of international groups. An example of this is the World
Trade Organization’s (WTO) intervention regarding the U.S.’s
extraterritorial income exclusion and foreign sales corporation provisions.93
The foreign sales corporation provision, which was enacted in 1984,
exempted from U.S. tax part of the income earned from products sold abroad
by foreign subsidiaries of U.S. manufacturers.94 These provisions were
enacted to resolve a prior dispute under the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) regarding the EU’s protest of the U.S.’ domestic
international sales corporation provisions.95 A little over a decade later, the
EU levied a similar challenge against the foreign sales corporation before a
dispute resolution panel of the successor to GATT, the WTO, and the WTO
upheld the challenge.96 To respond to this ruling, the U.S. enacted the FSC
Repeal and Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act in 2000.97 Adopting the
extraterritorial income exclusion as a replacement for the foreign sales
corporation, this provision applied to all sales and leases by foreign
subsidiaries, regardless of where the products were manufactured, so long as
the manufacturer agreed to be subject to the taxing authority of the U.S.98
The EU challenged this again in 2001 as an illegal export subsidy, leading
the WTO rule against the U.S.99 After a protracted battle, the U.S. repealed
the exclusion of income for exporters and adopted a deduction for domestic

92. Id.
93. For more description of the background of these provisions and the WTO and preceding
interventions, see Hearing on the WTO’s Extraterritorial Income Decision Before the H. Comm. on
Ways & Means, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Barbara Angus, International Tax Counsel, U.S.
Dep’t of the Treasury), available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/legacy/fullcomm/107cong/2-2702/2-27angu.htm [hereinafter Testimony of Barbara Angus]; Charles I. Kingson, The Great
American Jobs Act Caper, 58 TAX L. REV. 327, 329–31 (2005).
94. Testimony of Barbara Angus, supra note 93.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.

1320

08 BANK SSRN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

[Vol. 40: 1307, 2013]

5/16/13 9:13 AM

Globalization of Corporate Tax Reform
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

manufacturers under the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004.100 As
“compensation” for the loss of the export subsidy, Congress “slightly
reduced the corporate tax rate on all goods manufactured in the United
States.”101
More directly, the U.S. may be pressured to collaborate in reform efforts
through its membership in the Group of Eight, or the “G8.” British Prime
Minister David Cameron announced that he was going to use his presidency
of the G8 in 2013 to “drive a more serious debate” on corporate tax evasion
by multinational firms.102 Cameron signaled that this would be a multilateral
effort among G8 member states: “In the UK we’ve already committed
hundreds of millions into this effort—but acting alone has its limits. Clamp
down in one country and the travelling caravan of lawyers, accountants and
financial gurus just moves on elsewhere. We need to act together at the
G8.”103
Even outside of the formal involvement of international trade
organizations, there is evidence that global corporate tax reform is
increasingly pressuring countries to reform their corporate tax systems. This
is most apparent in the pressure to reduce corporate tax rates. Although the
U.K. corporate tax rate had dropped two percentage points as part of the late
1990s reforms, there was soon agitation to lower it even further. In 2006,
the British Chambers of Commerce cited the fact that the U.K.’s corporate
tax rate, which was once the ninth lowest among OECD countries, had
dropped to the sixteenth lowest, claiming that “[o]ur current rate threatens to
harm business competitiveness.”104 The British Institute of Directors “called
for the main rate of corporation tax to be cut to 28 per cent,” noting that “[i]f
we are to remain competitive, we must act now,”105 while the Confederation
of British Industries (CBI) claimed that “the present corporation tax rate was
‘unsustainable’ because it was much higher than those of European
competitors” and that “[a] trickle of companies is relocating and our worry is

100. Id.
101. Kingson, supra note 93, at 330.
102. Mark Thompson, UK to Tax Cheats: ‘Wake Up and Smell the Coffee’, CNN MONEY (Jan.
24, 2013), http://money.cnn.com/2013/01/24/news/economy/cameron-tax-trade/.
103. Larry Elliott & Heather Stewart, David Cameron Makes Swipe at Starbucks as He Promises
Focus on Tax, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Jan. 24, 2013, http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2013/
jan/24/david-cameron-starbucks-focus-tax.
104. Gary Duncan, Chancellor Told to Cut Corporation Tax, TIMES (London), Mar. 10, 2006, at
56.
105. Id.
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that it might turn into a flood.”106 Even after the rate was cut to 28%, the
CBI pushed for an additional drop in rates to 18% by 2016.107 With the
change to a Conservative government in 2010, new Chancellor George
Osborne already reduced the corporate tax rate to 24% as of April 2012 and
has announced plans to reduce it to 22% percent in 2014.108 This would be
the lowest rate since 1965.109
Not only has the nominal U.K. corporate tax rate declined in recent
years, but the effective rate has dropped as well. In October 2010, the
Trades Union Congress (TUC) released a report describing several
“worrying trends,”110 including a decline in the corporate effective tax rate
from just below 28% in 2000 when the statutory rate was 30% to 23% in
2009 when the statutory rate had only dropped to 28%.111 Based upon the
expectation that the statutory rate would drop from 28% to 24% by 2015, the
TUC predicted that large companies would pay an effective corporate tax
rate of only 17% by 2014, which would be lower than the rate paid by small
companies and the majority of U.K. households.112 With both the pace and
the amount of rate reduction accelerating since the TUC report was released,
the effective rate will drop even further. According to the TUC, this will
mean that for the first time there will be “a regressive UK corporation tax
system.”113
The competitive pressure to harmonize corporate tax rates extends well
beyond Europe to include both the U.S. and Japan. Up until recently, these
two countries had the highest corporate tax rate among OECD countries,
with the U.S.’s combined federal and state effective rate of 39.2% placing it
13.7 percentage points ahead of the OECD average.114 Japan’s effective
corporate tax rate of 41% was even higher than the American rate,
reportedly contributing to the departure of many Japanese manufacturing

106. Christine Buckley, Cut Tax or Lose More Business, Says CBI, TIMES (London), Oct. 10,
2006, at 52.
107. Christine Buckley, Employers and Unions Lobby Over Corporate Tax Rate and Non Doms,
TIMES (London), Mar. 10, 2008, at 44.
108. Svenja O’Donnell, Osborne Cuts U.K. Corporation Tax Rate to 24% From April,
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 21, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-21/osborne-cuts-u-kcorporation-tax-rate-to-24-from-april.html; Budget 2012: Mixed Business Reaction to Budget, BBC
NEWS (Mar. 21, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-17460262.
109. Suzy Jagger, Corporate Tax Will Be the Lowest in G20, Osborne Promises CBI, TIMES
(London), May 20, 2010, at 39.
110. RICHARD MURPHY, TRADES UNION CONGRESS, THE CORPORATE TAX GAP 2 (2010),
available at http://www.tuc.org.uk/extras/corporatetaxgap.pdf.
111. Id. at 12.
112. Id. at 13–14.
113. Id. at 14.
114. Peter R. Merrill, Corporate Tax Policy for the 21st Century, 63 NAT’L TAX J. 623, 624
(2010).
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corporations to lower tax jurisdictions.115 The gap between these two
countries and the rest of the pack has widened with rate reductions in
Germany, Italy, Spain, and twenty-five other developed nations since
2001.116 In just the last two years alone, countries such as Canada, Finland,
Greece, India, New Zealand, and Slovenia have enacted corporate rate cuts,
and other countries such as Sweden are considering similar cuts in
response.117
To counter such corporate tax rate cuts and increase the general
competitiveness of business, the Japanese government announced plans in
late 2010 to reduce its corporate tax rate by five percentage points.118
Concern about growing revenue needs after the 2011 tsunami and ensuing
nuclear reactor issues delayed this plan, but it was revived and enacted in
2012.119 Although the rate reduction was not as momentous as it first
appeared because of a three-year “Special Reconstruction Corporation
Surtax” aimed at helping the country rebuild after the tsunami, it still
reduced the statutory rate to approximately 38% until 2015, when it drops to
35.64%.120 Moreover, given the reduction of South Korea’s main corporate
tax rate to 20% in 2012,121 the pressure will continue for further rate cuts in
Japan.
Japan’s move could accelerate the already-existing efforts to reduce
corporate tax rates in the U.S. The effective tax rates for American
corporations are much lower than the combined federal–state statutory rate,
but it was still estimated to be 27.9% in 2009, which was then the third

115. Japanese Manufacturers: Leaving Home, THE ECONOMIST (Nov. 18, 2010),
http://www.economist.com/node/17527225.
116. We’re Number One, Alas, WALL ST. J. (July 13, 2007), at A12,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118428874152665452.html.
117. KATARZYNA BILICKA & MICHAEL DEVEREUX, CBT CORPORATE TAX RANKING 2012, at 16,
tbl. 4 (2012); Johan Nylander, Sweden Plans to Cut Corporate Tax, THE SWEDISH WIRE (June 5,
2012), http://www.swedishwire.com/economy/14043-sweden-plans-to-cut-corporate-tax.
118. Hiroko Tabuchi, Its Recovery Sputtering, Japan Will Cut Corporate Income Tax Rate, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 14, 2010, at B4.
119. Richard Rubin, Japan’s Rate Drop Puts U.S. at Top of Corporate Tax Rankings,
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 2, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2012-04-02/japan-s-rate-dropputs-u-s-at-top-of-corporate-tax-rankings.html.
120. Taichi Haraguchi, Japan’s Corporate Tax Rate Cut: Given With One Hand, Taken Away
with the Other?, 2012 TAX POL’Y & CONTROVERSY BRIEFING 1, 84, available at
http://tmagazine.ey.com/insights/japans-corporate-tax-rate-cut-given-with-one-hand-taken-awaywith-the-other/.
121. BILICKA & DEVEREUX, supra note 117, at 16; Cho Jin-seo, Tax Cut Initiative to Reveal
MB’s True Colors, KOREA TIMES, Nov. 16, 2010, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/n
ews/biz/2011/04/123_76454.html.
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highest among OECD countries.122 A more recent estimate set the effective
average tax rate at 34.9% and the effective marginal tax rate at 23.3%,
which, when combined with Japan’s 2012 reform, leaves the U.S. with the
highest average rates among OECD countries.123 Although the differential
with the effective rates of other OECD nations is still considered to be
reasonably small,124 a number of U.S. government reports have been released
that have highlighted this problem.125 During the 2012 election campaign,
President Barack Obama proposed lowering the corporate tax rate to 28%,
albeit as part of a broader reform that would eliminate some deductions and
broaden the corporate tax base.126 Given a competing proposal from
Republican candidate Mitt Romney to lower the rate to 25%, the
Washington Post described it as “one of the few areas of real common
ground in American tax policy.”127
Even if the global pressure does not result in U.S. corporate tax reform,
the changes in corporate tax laws in other countries and regions have a direct
impact on U.S. multinational firms doing business in those countries. Manal
Corwin, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Tax Affairs, speaking
about the OECD’s base erosion and profit shifting project, recently opined
that “[w]hether tax reform [in the U.S.] will or will not happen, and when it
will happen if it does happen, in some ways becomes less relevant because
things are already happening at the OECD that are going to affect U.S.
multinationals.”128
The chance for individual firms to exit a given tax scheme will continue
to shrink as the effective corporate tax rates of the industrialized world
converge, and as alternate forms of corporate structure remain unavailable to

122. Merrill, supra note 114, at 624.
123. BILICKA & DEVEREUX, supra note 117, at 14, tbl. 3; US Displacing Japan as No 1 for
Highest
Corp
Taxes,
REUTERS
(Mar.
30,
2012),
http://www.reuters.com/assets/
print?aid=USL2E8EU5VV20120330.
124. JANE G. GRAVELLE & THOMAS L. HUNGERFORD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34229,
CORPORATE TAX REFORM: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 15 (2007).
125. Id. at 1–35; CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CORPORATE INCOME TAX RATES: INTERNATIONAL
COMPARISONS (Nov. 2005); U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TREASURY CONFERENCE ON BUSINESS
TAXATION AND GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS (2007); John D. McKinnon, Obama: Corporate Tax
Rate
Cut
Could
Be
“Win–Win”,
WALL
S T.
J.
(Oct.
4,
2010),
http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2010/10/04/obama-corporate-tax-rate-cut-could-be-win-win/.
126. Zachary A. Goldfarb, Obama Proposes Lowering Corporate Tax Rate to 28 Percent, WASH.
POST, Feb. 21, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/obama-to-proposelowering-corporate-tax-rate-to-28-percent/2012/02/22/gIQA1sjdSR_story.html.
127. Dylan Matthews, Everyone Wants to Lower Corporate Tax Rates. Here’s How You Do It.,
WASH.
POST
(Sept.
26,
2012),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/
wp/2012/09/26/everyone-wants-to-lower-corporate-tax-rates-heres-how-you-do-it/.
128. Treasury Official: U.S. Tax Reform Efforts Must Be Informed by International Fight Against
Base Erosion, ITPF, (Dec. 11, 2012), http://www.itpf.org/itpf_blog?article_id=18 (quoting Manal
Corwin, Treasury Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Tax Affairs).
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certain firms and in certain industries.129 Economists Jane Gravelle and
Thomas Hungerford, in a congressional report expanding on the work of
UCLA Professor Arnold Harbarger, concluded that “as long as countries
tend to choose tax rates similar to each other, which appears to be the case,
the world becomes like the original closed economy.”130 Although a truly
closed global economy might bring much needed stability to international
corporate rates, individual nations could find it difficult to use the corporate
tax in satisfying their particular domestic needs.131
IV. CONNECTING GLOBAL REFORM WITH U.S. INITIATIVES
Given the formal and informal pressures toward convergence of national
corporate tax systems and rates, the notion that corporate tax reform in the
United States can proceed in a purely unilateral fashion seems increasingly
unlikely. Indeed, as the OECD points out, while the business community
has been vocal throughout the last century about the need for bilateral or
multilateral efforts to avoid double taxation, they have been noticeably quiet
on the subject of such cooperative efforts in the context of reining in
corporate profits shifting and tax evasion.132 This may be because they know
that any unilateral efforts may be thwarted to the extent that they create
further distinctions between U.S. and global law that companies can
leverage for their own benefit. According to the OECD, part of the problem
is that “corporations often exploit differences in domestic tax rules and
international standards that provide opportunities to eliminate or
significantly reduce taxation.”133 As a result, the OECD concludes a
collaborative global effort is critical:
[I]t may be impossible for any single country, acting alone, to fully
address the issue. . . . Failure to collaborate in addressing BEPS
[base erosion and profit shifting] issues could result in unilateral
actions that would risk undermining the consensus-based
framework for establishing jurisdiction to tax and addressing double
taxation which exists today. The consequences could be damaging
in terms of increased possibilities for mismatches, additional

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

See BANK, supra note 1, at 264.
GRAVELLE & HUNGERFORD, supra note 124, at 15; see BANK, supra note 1, at 264.
See BANK, supra note 1, at 264.
OECD, supra note 87, at 1–2.
Id. at 2.
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disputes, increased uncertainty for business, a battle to be the first to
grab taxable income through purported anti-avoidance measures, or
a race to the bottom with respect to corporate income taxes. In
contrast, collaboration to address BEPS concerns will enhance and
support individual governments’ domestic policy efforts to protect
their tax base while protecting multinationals from uncertainty or
double taxation.134
The European Commission has sounded a similar message, concluding
that “[t]ax fraud and tax evasion is a multi-facetted [sic] problem which
requires a coordinated and multi-pronged response. Aggressive tax planning
is also a problem which requires urgent attention. These are global
challenges which no single Member State can face alone.”135
Tax officials have already embraced multilateralism in the context of
enforcement efforts. As one commentator observes, “[g]iven that the big
four accounting firms also operate world-wide, and tax administrations do
not, the latter have worked to seek out and share ‘best practice,’ often
accomplished with the assistance of international agencies such as the
OECD, IMF and World Bank.”136 The European Commission has pushed to
encourage and formalize such cooperation, noting: “Tax fraud and tax
evasion have an important cross-border dimension. Member States can only
address this problem effectively if they work together.
Improving
administrative cooperation between Member States’ tax administrations is
therefore a key objective of the Commission’s strategy in this area.”137
This paper should not be construed as stating a normative case either for
international cooperation or against acting in a country’s self-interest at the
expense of other countries.138 It does not mean that individual nations
should not act domestically. Indeed, many of the tax reform proposals in
Europe and elsewhere contemplate domestic action and acknowledge the
continued existence of legitimate differences in domestic policies on
particular issues.139 Nevertheless, to be successful, any attempt at domestic
corporate tax reform must be informed by and in some respects reflect

134. Id. at 3.
135. See Communication from the Commission, supra note 90, at 15.
136. John Hasseldine et al., Companies and Taxes in the UK: Actors, Actions, Consequences and
Responses, 10 ATAX EJOURNAL OF TAX RES. 532, 535 (2012).
137. Communication from the Commission, supra note 90, at 3.
138. For a discussion of such issues, see Allison Christians, Putting the Reign Back in Sovereign:
Advice for the Second Obama Administration, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1373 (2013); Peggy B. Musgrave,
Sovereignty, Entitlement, and Cooperation in International Taxation, 26 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1335,
1336 (2001).
139. Cf. Omri Y. Marian, Meaningless Comparisons: Corporate Tax Reform Discourse in the
United States, 32 VA. TAX REV. 133, 173–82 (2012) (noting that local differences may make it
difficult to compare tax reforms in seemingly similar countries).
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international standards and developments in the global corporate tax reform
movement.
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